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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(1) and Rules 35 and 41, U.R.A.P. A slip opinion answering
the certified questions from the U.S. District Court was issued by
this Court on April 22, 1993. (Appendix A) This Court extended the
time to file this petition for rehearing by order dated May 5, 1993.
(Appendix B)
ISSUES PRESENTED
(1) Did the Court misperceive the statutory definition of
"fault" contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1992) and thus
erroneously conclude that the Liability Reform Act was ambiguous?
(2) Does the Court's interpretation of the Liability
Reform Act create irreconcilable conflicts with Utah Code Ann.
§ 31-1-62 (1988) , a provision of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act?
(3) Does the Court's interpretation of the Liability
Reform Act render the act unconstitutional?
(4) Did the Court misapprehend the legislative intent
behind the Liability Reform Act?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the Court grants a rehearing at its discretion.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 et. seq. (Appendix C) and Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988) (appendix D) are determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The nature of the case, the course of proceedings below,
and the statement of facts material to the resolution of this issue
were set forth in the Order of Certification (Appendix E)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A. The Court Misapprehended the Definition of "Fault" as Defined
in the Act.
The Ccurt concluded that the Liability Reform Act was
ambiguous, because the term "defendant" as defined in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-37 (1992) appeared to contradict sections 78-27-38 and 40
(1992) , which state that each defendant is liable only for that
defendant's proportionate share of fault. The perceived ambiguity
arose only because the Court applied the term "fault" in a moral
sense to arrive at its determination. When the term "fault" is
applied as statutorily defined, the definition of "defendant" js
consistent with the principle that each defendant is responsible for
its own proportionate share of "fault."
B. The Court's Interpretation that of Liability Reform Act Con
flicts with the Worker's Compensation Act in Two Respects.
(1) The interpretation voids employee rights
granted by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988) provides that a worker
injured in the course of employment has both a right to collect
worker's compensation, and if the injury was caused by the wrongful
conduct of a third party, the right to bring an action against the
third party for damages. The Court's interpretation of the
Liability Reform Act has voided the worker's right to both claim
compensation and obtain damages.
(2) The Court's interpretation of the Act
regarding an employer's right to
reimbursement renders the Worker's
Compensation Act ambiguous.
The Court held that the employer is a "person seeking
recovery" under the Liability Reform Act. Under the Act a person
seeking recovery, such as an employer, cannot recover from any
defendant or group of defendants whose negligence is less than the
person seeking recovery. Yet, under § 35-1-62, the legislature
provided that the employer is to be fully reimbursed from damages
obtained from third parties regardless of the employer's negligence.
C. The Court's Interpretation of the Liability Reform Act Renders
the Act Unconstitutional.
The Court's interpretation renders the Liability Reform
Act incompatible with rights previously granted to an employee under
the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. Accordingly, the Liability
Reform Act is unconstitutional, because the legislature took a right
from plaintiff Sullivan without providing a substitute benefit or
without demonstrating a compelling governmental interest.
D. The Court Misapprehended the Legislative Intent Behind the
Liability Reform Act.
Numerous affidavits of the 1986 legislators, including the
sponsors and co-sponsors of the Act, clearly demonstrate that the
intent of the legislature was not to have the employer' s fault
apportioned by the factfinder.
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT EMPLOYED A NON-STATUTORY DEFINITION OF
"FAULT" TO DETERMINE THAT THE LIABILITY REFORM
ACT WAS AMBIGUOUS.
On page 3 of the Slip Opinion, the Court acknowledged that
"the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of
the statute." However, on pages 4 and 5, the Court determined that
the language of the statute was ambiguous and thereafter determined
legislative intent from sources outside the statutory language.
This determination of ambiguity was premised on the Court's
application of a non-statutory definition of "fault." While the
legislature statutorily defined the term "fault" to include only
"actionable" breaches of duty, acts or omissions, the Court appears
to have applied a much broader definition of "fault" to include a
notion of moral culpability. Hence, the Court concluded that
excluding employers in the fault apportionment would contravene
§ 78-27-30 and 40 of the Act:
If the Scoular parties, who allegedly contri
buted to the accident, are not included on the
special verdict form, the remaining defendants
will be potentially liable to plaintiff for an
amount in excess of their proportion of fault.
For example, if the Scoular parties were 90% at
fault and the defendants remaining in the action
were 10% at fault, the remaining defendants
would be apportioned 100% of any damages awarded
even though they were only 10% at fault. Such
a result would violate the plain language of
Sections 78-27-33 and -40.
Slip Opinion, p. 5. When one applies the statutorily defined
definition of "fault," sections 78-27-37, -38, and -40 are consis
tent and unambiguous.
In discussing "fault" the Court addressed the meaning of
the word "actionable" as used in the statutory definition:
The relevant definitions of the Act provide:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not
immune from suit who is claimed to be
liable because of fault to any person
seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach
of legal duty, act, or omission prox
imately causing or contributing to
injury or damages
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(1), (2) (1986) (empha
sis added). Plaintiff asserts that the require
ment that "fault" be "actionable" precludes the
inclusion of D&RG in apportionment.
Plaintiff urges a definition of "actionable"
fault that is too restrictive. An act or
omission may be actionable even if the plaintiff
cannot, as a practical matter, secure a judgment
against a defendant. Black's defines "action
able" as "[t]hat for which an action will lie,
furnishing legal ground for an action." Black's
Law Dictionary 29 (6th Ed. 1990). A plaintiff
may have legal grounds for a cause of action
against a defendant, and the defendant may be
dismissed due to, for example, the assertion of
a successful affirmative defense. Thus, the
Act's definition of "fault" does not necessarily
preclude the apportionment of fault of non
parties .
Slip Opinion, p. 11 (emphasis in the original.)
The Black's definition, upon which the Court relied, also
refers the reader to the definition of "Cause of Action" which
states:
The fact or facts which give a person a right to
judicial redress or relief against another. The
legal effect of an occurrence in terms of
redress to a party to the occurrence. A situa
tion or state of facts which would entitle [a]
party to sustain [an] action and give him a
right to seek judicial remedy in his behalf.
Thus, Black's definition of "actionable" in conjunction with the
definition of "cause of action" leads to the conclusion that for an
act or omission to be "actionable" there must be legal grounds for
the party to bring an action in a court to enforce a right.
While a plaintiff may have grounds to assert a claim in
court and yet be denied that claim due to an affirmative defense
(such as a statute of limitation), the same concept is not true in
the employee-employer context. The only recognized cause of action
that an employee may assert against his employer in court is the
employer's refusal to pay worker's compensation benefits. In Salt
Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 74 P.2d 657, 659 (Utah 193 7),
this Court stated:
When the employer refuses or ceases to pay
compensation, the cause of action against him
arises.
This result necessarily follows from the fact that an employee has
no cause of action against his employer arising out of fault in the
sense of moral culpability.
Early on, this Court noted in Baker v. Wycoff. 79 P.2d 77,
85 (Utah 1938) :
The liability of the employer and insurance
carrier accrues because of an accidental injury
arising out of or in the course of employment.
It. does not depend on or arise out of negligence
of the employer. The statute has provided a new
remedy for injury in industry instead of common-
law remedy for negligence.
The fact that fault plays no role in the worker's compensation
context was most recently stated by the Utah Court of Appeals in
Large v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App.
1988) :
Proximate cause is used primarily in tort law
and involves analysis of foreseeability, negli
gence and intervening causes. These factors are
not present in the statutory worker's compensa
tion system, which excludes consideration of
fault.
Since an employee has no legal grounds for an action
against his employer premised on an employer's acts, the employer
cannot, as a matter of statutory definition, be at "fault" under the
Liability Reform Act. Because the employer cannot be at "fault"
under the statutory definition, there is no "fault" to be appor
tioned to the employer, and the non-employer defendants participate
in damages in proportion to their own "fault" without reference to
the employer's acts .
The Liability Reform Act is internally consistent and
unambiguous when the defined terms are appropriately applied. This
Court, therefore, does not need to refer to sources outside the
specific language of the statute to determine the legislature's
intent.
II . THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LIABILITY
REFORM ACT RENDERS THE ACT INCONSISTENT WITH THE
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT.
On page 6 of the Slip Opinion, the Court states
This interpretation of the Liability Reform Act
is in harmony with the Worker's Compensation
Act; "when a construction of an act will bring
it into serious conflict with another act," we
have a duty to "construe the acts to be in
harmony and to avoid conflicts." Jerz v. Salt
Lake County, 822 P. 2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991}
(citations omitted).
The Court's interpretation of the Liability Reform Act conflicts
with the Worker's Compensation Act in two respects. First, the
interpretation negates rights granted to the employee under Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988). Second, the Court's categorization of
the employer as "a person seeking recovery" under the Liability
Reform Act places in question the employer's right to reimbursement
under the Worker's Compensation Act.
A. The Court's Interpretation Precludes an Employee from Obtaining
His or Her Statutorily Granted Right to Obtain Both Compensation and
Damages.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988) states in relevant part:
When any injury or death for which compensation
is payable under this title shall have been
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a
person other than an employer, . . . the injured
employee, . . . may claim compensation and the
injured employee . . . may also have an action
for damages against such third person.
While the foregoing statute purports to permit the injured employee
to claim both compensation and damages, the Court's interpretation
of the Liability Reform Act precludes any possibility of that
eventuality ever taking place.
As the Court has previously recognized, § 35-1-62(2)
provides that an employer "shall be reimbursed in fuli for a11
payments made less the proportionate share of costs and attorneys
fees." As the Court has interpreted the Liability Reform Act, non-
employers liable in tort to the injured employee would pay only
their proportionate share of damages based on their "fault." This
recovery is always paid to the employer to the extent of the
employer's lien.
If the recovery exceeded compensation, the net recovery to
the employee is the total damages paid by the tortfeasors, and thus,
the employee would, in essence, receive no compensation from the
employer.'' If the recovery was less than the worker's compensation,
the employer would take the full recovery to satisfy its lien. The
employee would therefore be left with only the net amount of the
worker's compensation payment. One of these two alternatives
results no matter what the apportionment of fault between the
employer and non-employer defendants. Under the Court's interpreta
tion of the Liability Reform Act, the employee has no possibility of
ever receiving both compensation and damages -- a result not only
clearly contradicting the terms of § 35-1-62 (1988) but also
unconstitutional. (See Argument III.)
B- The Court's Interpretation Creates an Ambiguity as to What the
Employer May Recover.
On page 7 of the Slip Opinion, the Court states:
Third, the Utah Liability Reform Act also
provides for a jury to apportion the fault of
"person seeking recovery." Id. § 78-27-39. The
Act defines "person (s) seeking recovery" as "any
person seeking damages or reimbursement on its
own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it
is authorized to act as legal representative."
Id. § 78-27-37(3). Thus, due to the reimburse
ment provision of the Worker's Compensation Act,
employers (or their insurance carriers) may be
legitimately viewed as persons seeking recovery
under the Act.
'This Court recognized the inequity of this result, but
indicated that Sullivan's remedy was a legislative one. Slip
opinion, p. 11. Sullivan respectfully suggests that any legislative
attempt to retroactively change the lien statute would most^probably
be held unconstitutional.
If the employer is considered "a person seeking recovery" under the
Liability Reform Act, the provisions of § 78-27-38 come into play:
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not
alone bar recovery by that person. He may
recover from any defendant or group of defen
dants whose fault exceeds his own. [Emphasis
added.]
Under the Court's interpretation, the Liability Reform Act precludes
an employer from obtaining damages if the employer's fault exceeds
that of non-employer defendants. Yet, this result is directly
contrary to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1988) which
specifically states that the employer shall be reimbursed in full
from the damages obtained from non-employer defendants.
III. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE LIABILITY
REFORM ACT RAISES SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES.
The Court's opinion recognized that its interpretation of
the Liability Reform Act shifted the risk of an immune or insolvent
tortfeasor from other tortfeasors to the plaintiff. See Slip
Opinion at 9. The Court erroneously suggested that "Plaintiff s
recovery from nonemployer defendants would be reduced directly in
proportion to the percentage of fault, if any, the jury attributes
to the employer." Id. (See Point II -- The employee may well
receive nothing from nonemployee defendants depending on the
apportionment.)
At the same time, the lien reimbursement provisions of
§ 35-1-62 allow an employer or insurer to obtain full reimbursement
without reduction in any respect by the employer's having contri
buted to the employee's injuries. See Slip Opinion, at 10. The
10
inequitable outcome of the interaction of these provisions as
interpreted by the Court was noted:
Consequently, when a verdict is granted to the
plaintiff in an amount equal to or greater than
the employer's workers' compensation payments,
the Act allows an at-fault employer to escape
liability altogether at the expense of the
injured employee. We agree with plaintiff that
this result is inequitable, but the effect of
the statutory language is clear.
Id. (footnote omitted) .
The inequitable result visited upon the plaintiff through
this interpretation is not simply unfortunate, but unconstitutional.
The Court should interpret legislation in harmony with other,
existing law and in a manner upholding its constitutionality, if at
all possible. Murray City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983);
State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 58 (Utah App. 1989).
Under the Worker's Compensation Act the plaintiff is
granted the right to pursue an action for an on-the-job injury,
notwithstanding worker's compensation benefits, with the proviso
that upon successfully obtaining a third party recovery those
benefits must be repaid. Section 35-1-62. Once granted this right,
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 11 (the "open courts provision") precludes
it being abrogated without "an effective and reasonable alternative
remedy 'by due court of law' for vindication of [one's] constitu
tional interest. Berry by and through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717
P. 2d 670, 684 (Utah 1985} . The substitute benefit "must be
substantially equal in value or other benefit to the remedy
abrogated. ..." Id.
11
As the dissent notes, "the policy adopted by the legisla
ture divides the fault of an immune party among both plaintiffs and
defendants. The policy adopted by the majority, en the other hand,
loads that fault entirely onto a plaintiff." Slip Opinion at 16,
Stewart, J. dissenting (emphasis in original). The Court's
interpretation of the Act directly abrogates a plaintiff's recovery
to the extent fault is attributed to the employer, with no substi
tute benefit whatsoever. Such a result runs directly counter to the
protections afforded by our Constitution in the open courts provi
sion, Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 11.
[T]he basic purpose of Article I, section 11 is
to impose some limitation on [the power of the
Legislature to create new rules of law and to
abrogate old ones] for the benefit of those per
sons who are injured in their persons, property
or reputations since they are generally isolated
in society, belong to no identifiable group, and
rarely are able to rally the political process
in their aid.
Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 357 (Utah 1989)
(citing Berry, 717 P.2d at 676).
The Court's interpretation runs afoul of the due process
clause, Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 7, as well."' As this Court noted
in Condemarin, "the open courts provision and the due process clause
. . . have an overlapping function, to some extent, with respect to
the abrogation of causes of action." Id. (citing Berry, 717 P.2d at
679). The Condemarin court recognized that "the seriousness of the
2Where the industrial injury results in death, the protections
of the Utah Const. Art. XVI,, Sec. 5 absolutely precluding abrogation
of the right to recover damages for wrongful death are also
compromised by the Court's application of the Act. See Horton v.
Goldminer's Daughter. 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989); Berry, 717 P.2d at
684, 685; Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 667 (Utah 1984).
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abrogation of personal rights . . . [requires] a . . . straight
forward balancing process. . ./'of a due process analysis where the
Court will "assess the reasonableness" of the legislative incursion
upon individual rights "against the degree of intrusion on rights
protected by the Utah Constitution.11 Id. at 356-357.
Adopting the analytic process of Berry, the Condemarin
court acknowledged that
Legislative attempts to abrogate those rights
[protected by article I, section 11] should be
closely examined by this Court and struck down
when the disability they seek to impose on
individual rights is too great to be justified
by the benefits accomplished or when the legis
lation is simply an arbitrary and impermissible
shifting of collective burdens to individual
citizens.
Id. at 358. Such is the case at hand. The rights to third party
recovery are protected by our Constitution. The interpretation of
the Act adopted by this Court impermissibly abrogates those rights
and arbitrarily shifts the burden entirely upon the injured plain
tiff, rather than apportioning that burden as the legislation was
intended to accomplish.
A legislative determination to interfere with,
limit, or abrogate the availability of remedies
for injuries to person, property, or reputation
requires an important state interest and a
rational means of implementation. The greater
the intrusion upon the constitutionally protect
ed interest, the great and more explicit the
state' s reasons must be. It is necessary for
the legislature, first, and this Court, second,
to balance the weight of the governmental
interest at stake against the countervailing
importance of the individual rights being
compromised.
Id. This Court's opinion has identified no important government
interest requiring this degree of compromise of the injured plain-
13
tiff's rights, nor is the one-sided application of that Act a
rational means of implementation. As Justice Zimmerman noted, in his
concurrence in Condemarin,
The constitution's drafters understood that the
normal political processes would not always
protect the common law rights of all citizens to
obtain remedies for injuries. ... At any one
time, only a small percentage of the citizenry
will have recently been harmed and therefore
will need to obtain a remedy from the members of
any particular defendant class. The vast major
ity of the populace will have no interest in
opposing legislative efforts to protect such a
defendant class because the majority will not
readily identify with those few persons unlucky
enough to have been harmed. And those few
persons directly affected will, in all likeli
hood, lack the political power to prevent the
passage of legislation that, in essence, re
quires every member of the citizenry who is
injured by members of the defendant class to
bear some or all of the cost of those injuries.
Id. at 367 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in Part) (citations omitted).
IV. THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
BEHIND THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT.
This Court recognized that its primary function is to
accurately determine the legislative intent in interpreting a
statute in dispute. "The Court's principal duty in interpreting
statutes is to determine legislative intent . . . ." Slip Opinion,
p. 3. The Appendix F contains the affidavits of numerous legis
lators from the 1986 session which overwhelmingly demonstrate that
the legislative intent was to not have the employer's conduct
included in the determination of fault.
Those legislators addressing the issue include the primary
sponsor of S.B. 64 (which became the Liability Reform Act of 1986),
Sen. Haven Barlow; the representative that carried the bill through
14
the House of Representatives, former Representative Jack DeMann; and
numerous other present and former legislators who co-sponscred the
bill and/or acted upon it. The legislative intent could not be more
clearly stated than by the bill's sponsor, Sen. Barlow, who states
at paragraph 9 of his affidavit, "It is my opinion that the Legisla
ture intended that employers be excluded from any fault comparison
so as not to alter the Worker' s Compensation Act because their
responsibility for their injured employees was already provided for
in the Act."
CONCLUSION, RELIEF REQUESTED AND CERTIFICATION
Utah R. App. P. contemplates that rehearing may be granted
if there are "points of law or fact which . . . the court has
overlooked or misapprehended . . . ." Rule 35(a) U.R.A.P. Peti
tioner respectfully submits that for the foregoing reasons, the
Court misapprehended legislative intent when interpreting the
Liability Reform Act and that the Court should grant the petition
for rehearing. Counsel certifies that this petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.
DATED this <£C "~ day of May, 1993.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.O.
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APPENDIX A
Sullivan v. Scoular et al. Slip Opinion
No. 910482
I'/iis amnion is subject to revision before final
iWtiiicaunn in the Pacific Reporter.
'.U THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STAT" OF UTAH
00O00
Kenneth Ray Sullivan,
Plaintiff,
v.
Scoular Grain Company of Utah;
Union Pacific Railroad Company,
a Utah corporation ; Scoular
Grain Company, The Scoular
Company, Robert O'Block, and
Gordon Olch, dba Freeport
Center Associates; Trackmobile,
Inc., a Georgia corporation,
formerly known as Whiting Corp.;
The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, a
Delaware corporation; Oregon
Short Line Railroad Company,
a Utah corporation; Utan
Power & Light Company, a
Utah corporation; and G.W.
Van Keppel Company, a
Missouri corporation.
Defendants.
Federal Certification
Attorneys:
No. 9104 8 2
FILED
April 22, 1993
Geotfrey J. Butler, Clerk
M. Douglas Bayly, L. Rich Humpherys, Salt Lake City,
for Sullivan
Paul M. Belnap, Victoria K. Kidman, Salt Lake City,
for Trackmobile, Inc.
D. Gary Christian, Michael F. Skolnick, Salt Lake
City, for G.W. Van Keppel Company
J. Clare Williams, Salt Lake City, for Oregon Short
Line Railroad and Union Pacific Railroad
H. James Clegg, Salt Lake City, for Utah Power
and Light
On Certification from the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, Central Division,
The Honorable J. Thomas Greene
nnmTAM. Justice:
This case comes to us pursuant to rule 41 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure as a question certified from the
United States District Court for the District of Utah. Two
issues have been accepted on certification:
1. Under the Utah Comparative Fault
Act,1 Utah Code Annot. § 78-27-38, et. seq.,
can a jury apportion the fault of the
plaintiff's employers that caused or
contributed to the accident although said
employers are immune from suit under Utah
Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-60, et. seq.
2. Under the Utah Comparative Fault
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38, et seq., can
a jury apportion the fault of an individual
or entity that has been dismissed from tne
litigation but against whom it is claimed
that they have caused or contributed to the
accident.
We hold that the purpose and intent of the Utah
Liability Reform Act require that a jury account for the relative
proportion of fault of a plaintiff's employer that may have
caused or contributed to an accident, even though the employer is
immune from suit. Apportionment of fault does not ot itself
subject the employer to civil liability. Rather, the
apportionment process merely ensures that no detendant is held
liable to any claimant for an amount of damages m excess of the
percentage of fault attributable to that defendant.
'V^|^-V'-'"T' "• We also hold that an individual or entity dismissed
y;tv^V'''"'from a case pursuant to an adjudication on the merits of the
•'7;V.*tf"--
1 These issues are reproduced exactly as certified by the
United States District Court. However, "Utah Comparative Fault
Act" is not the official name of the act cited here. In 1986,
the Utah Legislature repealed what was the Comparative Negligence
Act and enacted the present Liability Reform Act. 1986 Utah Laws
ch. 199.
2 These are issues of first impression in Utah. Defendant
Trackmobile cited three Utah cases in support of the merits of
its motion to apportion fault. We do not address those cases
because they were decided before the enactment of the statute at
issue and are not dispositive of any question now before the
court.
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liability issue may not be included in the apportionment.0 When
a defendant is dismissed due to a determination of lack of fault
as a matter of law, the defendant's exclusion from apportionment
does not subject the remaining defendants to liability for
damages in excess of their proportionate fault.
The following facts are taken from the federal district;
court's certification order. In October 1986, plaintiff Kenneth ''
Sullivan lost his left arm and left leg in an accident on the
railroad tracks at the Freeport Center in Clearfield, Utah. At
the time of his injury, Sullivan was assigned to unload grain
from rail cars into warehouses. He was employed by Scoular Grain
Company, Freeport Center Associates, and Scoular Grain Company of
Utah ("the Scoular parties").
Sullivan filed this action against the Scoular parties,
Union Pacific Railroad Company, Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company, Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, Utah Power
& Light Company, Trackmobile, Inc., and G.W. Van Keppel Company.
In 1989, the federal district court found the Scoular parties
immune from plaintiff's claim unaer the exclusive remeay
provision of Utah's Workers' Compensation Law ana dismissed them
from the action. That court also found that derenaant Denver &
Rio Grande Western Railroad had no legal duty to Sullivan and
dismissed it from the lawsuit. The remaining defendants in the
case are Utah Power u Light, Trackmobile, G.W. Van Keppel, Union ,
Pacific Railroad, and Oregon Short Line Railroad. A motion to
dismiss Utah Power & Light for lack of jurisdiction is pending at
this time.
Defendant Trackmobile moved to have the jury apportion
and compare the fault of all the originally named defendants, ;
whether dismissed or present at trial. Plaintiff opposed this
motion, claiming that only the fault of parties who are
defendants at trial may be compared.
I. IMMUNE EMPLOYERS !
A. Statutory Interpretation
The court's principal duty in interpreting statutes is.
to determine legislative intent, and the best evidence of
legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. Jensen
3 We do not decide whether a jury may apportion the fault of
persons who are not parties in an action for reasons other than
dismissal on the merits. The question may arise when potentially
liable persons are excluded from an action due to, for example,
failure of service of process, settlement, a covenant not to sue,
a plaintiff's failure to join a party, an applicable statute of
limitations, or some other affirmative defense.
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v. Tntermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah
1984) .
Plaintiff argues that his former employers must be
excluded from the apportionment process because they are not
"defendants" under the Liability Reform Act's definition.
Section 68-3-11 of the Utah Code states that "words and phrases
. . . [which] are defined by statute, are to be construed
according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or
definition." Under section 78-27-39 of the Liability Reform Act,
a jury may be instructed "to find separate special verdicts
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person
seeking recovery and to each defendant." Section 78-27-37(1)
defines "defendant" as "any person not immune from suit who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking
recovery." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, plaintiff argues,
because the district court found the Scoular parties to be
"immune from suit" under the exclusive remedy provision of Utah
Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60, they are not
defendants and are excluded from apportionment under the plain
language of the Act.
Excluding plaintiff's employers from the apportionment
process, however, would directly conflict with the language of
other sections of the Act which require that no derendant be held,
liable for damages in excess of its proportion of fault.1* The
relevant portions of sections 78-27-38 and -40 read as follows:
78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery snail
not alone bar recovery by that person. He
may recover from any defendant or group of
defendants whose fault exceeds his own.
However, no defendant is liable to any person
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of
the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant.
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited
to proportion of fault—No contribution.
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum
amount for which a defendant may be liable to
any person seeking recovery is that
percentage or proportion of the damages
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant. No
defendant is entitled to contribution from
any other person.
4 This is true except in those cases in which an employer
did not cause or contribute to the employee's injury.
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(Err.pnasis added.) If the Scoular parties, who allegedly
contributed to the accident, are not included on the special
verdict form, the remaining defendants will be potentially liable-
to Dlaintiff for an amount in excess of their proportion of '
fault. For example, if the Scoular parties were 90% at fault and'
the defendants remaining in the action were 10% at fault, the
remaining defendants would be apportioned 100% of any damages
awarded even though they were only 10% at fault.3 Such a result :
would violate the plain language of sections 73-27-38 and -40.
Thus, we are faced with two arguably contradictory
statutes within the same article. Section 78-27-37 defines
"defendant" in a way that appears to preclude the inclusion of an
employer from apportionment. But excluding employers from
apportionment would violate the mandate of section 78-27-40 that
no'defendant be held liable for damages greater than its
proportion of fault. This conflict creates an ambiguity that
requires the court to make a policy inference as to the overall
purpose and intent of the Act.
B. Legislative History
"When interpreting an ambiguous statute, we first try
to discover the underlying intent of the legislature, guiced by
the purpose of the statute as a whole and the legislative
history." Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 833, 841 (Utah
1990) (citations omitted). We then try to harmonize ambiguous
provisions accordingly. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 80S P.2d
1037, 1045 (Utah 1991).
In the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature, Substitute
Senate Bill No. 64 proposed that a jury may determine the "total -
amount of damages sustained and a percentage or proportion of
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each
defendant, and to each other person whose fault contributed to
the injury or damages." (Emphasis added.) Before being enacted,
the bill was amended by deleting the part underlined above and ;
inserting the word "and" before "to each defendant." The result
is codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39:
The trial court may, and when requested by
any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to
find separate special verdicts determining
the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery
and to each defendant.
5 The percentages used here are merely for purposes of
illustration and do not reflect any factual determination of the
actual fault of the parties involved.
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-ullivan argues that this amendment shows that the legislature
did not intend to include nonparties in the apportionment
process.
Trackmobile counters that the reason for the amendment
is not clear and argues that, by contrast, the intent of the
comparative negligence statute to limit a defendant's liability
to his or her proportion of fault is clear. That purpose is to
ensure that "no defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault
attributable to that defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38.
"The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to
give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the
purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Reeves v. Gentile.,
813 P 2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991) (footnote omitted). Thus, tailing
to include immune employers in the apportionment violates the
main purpose of the Act by improperly subjecting the remaining
defendants to liability in excess ot their proportion ot lault.
Other portions of the Act's history support this
conclusion. First, during a floor debate prior tc the adoption
of the bill, one senator observed that "it is the basic fairness
concept we're driving at. The defendant ought to be on the hoe,:
only for its own percentage of damages, but ougnt not be the
guarantor for everyone else's damages." Floor Debate, Utah
Senate 46th Leg. 1986, General Sess., Senate Day 31, Records
No 63 (Feb 12 1986). Second, each preliminary draft ot Senate
Bill 64 states in the title that the purpose ot the Act was
among other things, "abolishing joint and several liability It
the jury is prevented in this case from considering the relat
fault of the Scoular parties in the apportionment process,
Trackmobile and the other defendants will be held liable in t
event of a verdict for plaintiff, not only tor their own
proportionate share of fault, but also for the proportionate
share of fault attributable to the Scoular parties. Thus, one of
the major evils of joint and several liability would result, and,
the stated purpose of the legislature in abolishing it would be
frustrated.
This interpretation ot the Liability Reform Act is in
harmony with the Workers' Compensation Act; "when a construction'
of an act will bring it into serious conflict with another act,"
w^ have a duty to "construe the acts to be in harmony and to
avoid conflicts." Jgrz^_SaltLj,ake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773
(Utah 1991) (citations omitted). The Workers' Compensation Act
nrovides an injured employee's "exclusive remedy" against an
employer in place of any other "civil liability" and provides
1-h^t no "action at law" may be maintained against an employer
based on any injury to an employee Utah Code Ann. | 35-1-60.
In our view this exclusive remedy does not bar the Scoular
parties from the apportionment process because apportionment is
not an action at law and would not impose any civil liability on
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ive
n the
--o .:r0ular parties. Thus, the jury should consider acts or
emissions by the Scoular parties in its liability deliberations.
plaintiff's concerns about procedural problems with
aooortionment are not persuasive. We believe that employers are
-ot oreiudiced bv being included in the apportionment process tor
th-e^ -easons. First, employers have a financial interest in the
outcome of the action. The Workers' Compensation Act provides
"-he oerson liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in' full for all payments made [by the third-party defendant to
the injured employee] less the proportionate share ot costs ana
attorneys' fees . . . ." Id. § 35-1-62(2).
Second, the Workers' Compensation Act expressly
provides employers (or their insurance carriers) notice and a
reasonable opportunity to appear in the action. The Utah
Workers' Compensation Act provides:
Before proceeding against the third party,
the injured employee, or, in case of deatn,
his heirs, shall give written notice ot sucn
intention to the carrier or other person
obligated for the compensation payments, in
order to give such person a reasonable
opportunity to enter an appearance m the
proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62.
Third the Utah Liability Reform Act also provides for
a jury to apportion the fault of "person[s] seeking recovery.jdJ S78-27-39. The Act defines "person seeking recovery" as
^ny person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own benaif,
or on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal
representative." Id, § 78-27-37(3). Thus, due to the
reimbursement provision of the Workers' Compensation Act
em^oyerstor ?heir insurance carriers) may be legitimately
viewed as persons seeking recovery under the Act.
Therefore, employers have a financial interest in the
.nnortionment process. Because the legislature has expressly
provided U) that employers be given notice and an opportunity toproviaea l-W £ . apportion the fault of persons
Peking r^ovirywe^llev^ that ?? is not procedurally unfair
for a jury to apportion the fault of nonparty employers.
C. Other Jurisdictions
Other states have dealt with the issue of how to
<-^n fault in workers' compensation third-party actions in a
apportion fault ™vordix yfor examples. Although these
decisions invoke somewhat different statutes, their reasoning
may be helpful. For example, the California Court of Appeal
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recently ruled in a case substantially similar to the case at
bar Mills v. MMM Carpets, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Ct. App.
1991),~review dismissed, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635 (1992). In Mills,
a bank employee sued various parties for damages because she was
injured when the heel of her shoe punctured a section of
carpeting that had been laid over an uncovered utility hole.^ The
employer's insurer intervened, seeking indemnity for workers'
compensation benefits it had paid to the plaintiff on behalf of
the employer. The defendants claimed that under California's
Fair Responsibility Act, the contributive fault of the employer
should be considered in determining the proportionate share of
each defendant's liability for noneconomic damages. California's
Fair Responsibility Act provides in relevant part:
In any action for personal injury, property
damage, or wrongful death, based upon
principles of comparative fault, the
liability of each defendant for non-economic
damages shall be several only and shall not
be joint. Each defendant shall be liabLe
only for the amount ot non-economic aamage_s_
allocated to that defendant in direct
proportion to that defendant's percentaqe_or.
fault, and a separate judgment snail be
rendered against that derendant lor that
amount.
Cal Civ. Code § 1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1993) (empnasis added).
The court, noting that the purpose or the Act was to abolish the
inequity and injustice of joint and several liability, decided
that excluding the plaintiff's employer from apportionment would
"result [in] a form of joint liability which the statute is meant
to avoid" and held that "the apportionment of liability . . .
must take into account the fault of all tortfeasors, whether or
not they are named as defendants, [or] subject to liability for
damages." 1 Cal. Rptr. at 814, 817. The court conceded that
employers are "generally immune from tort liability" under
California's workers' compensation law and noted in addition that
the Fair Responsibility Act "is not intended, in any way, to
alter the law of immunity." Id. at 818. Nevertheless, creating
a rule which it found consistent with both acts, the court
explained that "the negligent employer's fault in a case like
this one is measured, not in order to impose tort liability o-
it but to determine the comparative fault and commensurate
liability of a defendant in the action." Id_^
We have applied similar reasoning in holding that
Utah's Liability Reform Act requires a jury to apportion the
fault of a plaintiff's employer even though the employer is
immune from suit under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act.
n
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D. Equitable Considerations
Any judicial or legislative decision concerning tort
liaoility requires a balancing of competing interests and a
policy decision as to which party should bear the risks of an
immune or insolvent tort-feasor. Prior to 1986, under joint and
several liability, a tort-feasor bore the risk of paying not only
his or her share of the plaintiff's damages, but also the shares
of other tort-feasors who were impecunious or immune from suit.
The 1986 Utah Liability Reform Act shifted the risks caused by
impecunious or immune tort-feasors to the plaintiffs by
abolishing joint and several liability and contribution among
tort-feasors.
Plaintiff correctly asserts that if his employer's
actions are included in apportionment, his recovery may be
significantly reduced. Plaintiff's recovery from nonemployer
defendants would be reduced directly in proportion to the
percentage of fault, if any, the jury attributes to the employer.
On the other hand, in Trackmobile's view, fairness to
the defendants requires that each defendant pay only its
proportionate share of the plaintiff's damages. if the Scoular
parties are not included in apportionment, Trackmobile and the
other defendants would be liable for damages in excess of their
proportion of fault. "There is nothing inherently fair about a
defendant who is[, for example,] 10% at fault paying 100% of the
loss . . . ." Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978).
General comparative negligence theory also supports the
inclusion of nonparty employers in apportionment. For example,
according to Heft and Heft:
It is accepted practice to include all
tortfeasors in the apportionment question.
This includes nonparties who may be unknown
tortfeasors, phantom drivers, and persons
alleged to be negligent but not liable in
damages to the injured party such as in the
third party cases arising in the workmen's
compensation area.
The reason for such rules is that true
apportionment cannot be achieved unless that
apportionment includes all tortfeasors guilty
of causal negligence either causing or
contributing to the occurrence in question,
whether or not they are parties to the case.
Carroll R. Heft & C. James Heft, Comparative Negligence Manual,
§ 8.100 at 14 (John J. Palmer & Stephen M. Flanaqan eds., rev.
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od 1992) (footnote omitted). Thus, it is accepted practice for
the jury to apportion the comparative fault of all tort-feasors
when comparative negligence is at issue.b
Plaintiff also protests the detrimental effect on his
recovery created by the employer reimbursement provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act. Section 35-1-62 provides for an
employer or insurer to obtain reimbursement for any payments made
to an injured employee. This lien is not reduced in any respect
by the amount by which the employer's act or omission contributed
to the employee's injuries. Thus, any judgment Sullivan wins
aqainst a party defendant will be reduced up to the amount the
insurer in this case paid to Sullivan in workers' compensation
benefits.
Consequently, when a verdict is granted to the
plaintiff in an amount equal to or greater than the employer's
workers' compensation payments, the Act allows an at-tault
employer to escape liability altogether at the expense ot the
injured employee.7 We agree with plaintiff that this result is
inequitable, but the effect or the statutory language is clear.
However, "[wjhere statutory lanquage is plain and
unambiguous," we will "not look beyond the same to divine
legislative intent." Rrinkerhotf v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, boo
(Utah 1989). The language ot section J5-l-o2(2) is unambiguous
on this point: "The person liable for compensation payments
shall be reimbursed in full for all payments mace [by a third
party to an injured employee] less the proportionate share oi
costs and attorney's fees provided for in Subsection (1).' Utan
Code Ann. § 35-1-62(2) (emphasis added). We are not tree to
6 A solid majority of states in the Pacific region have
adopted the practice of apportioning the fault of nonparties in
neqliqence actions. These states have done so either expressly
bv statute or by judicial interpretation. In addition, several
states allow consideration of nonparty negligence while retainingjoint and several liability. See Appendix tor a sampling ot
cases
7 The Kansas Supreme Court recognized the inequity in
allowing a partially negligent employer to recover full
subrogation in NgglgX-^-M^s^Y Ferguson, Inc. 62P.2d 472, 475
(Kan 1981) but refused to reduce the employer's lien because
"rtlhe extent and nature of the subrogation rights of an employer
under the workmen's compensation statutes are matters for
legislative determination." Id, at 476. To remedy this
inequity, the Kansas Legislature amended its workers'
compensation law to provide that the employer's subrogation
interest "shall be diminished by the percentage of the damage
award attributed to the negligence of the employer." Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 44-504(d) (Supp. 1990).
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assess the wisdom of a statutory scheme." West Jordan v.
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 fUtah 1982). Moreover, no challenge
to the validity of the reimbursement provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act is before this court at this time. Thus,
plaintiff's remedy on this point is a legislative one.
II. DISMISSED NONEMPLOYER DEFENDANTS
The remaining nonemployer defendants in the case are
Utah Power & Light, Trackmobile, G.W. Van Keppel, Union Pacific
Railroad, and Oregon Short Line Railroad. As noted above, the
district court found that Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
("D&RG") had no legal duty to Sullivan and dismissed it from the
lawsuit.
Trackmobile urges that all named defendants, including
those dismissed from the proceeding, be included in
apportionment. However, plaintiff argues that because the trial
court dismissed D&RG, it is not a defendant and the jury may not
consider its actions or omissions in the apportionment process.
Plaintiff again relies heavily on the definitions or the
Liability Reform Act for support. The relevant derinitions of
the Act provide:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not
immune from suit who is claimed to be liable
because of fault to any person seeking
recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach
of legal duty, act, or omission proximately
causing or contributing to injury or damages
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(1), (2) (1986) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff asserts that the requirement that "fault" be
"actionable" precludes the inclusion of D&RG in apportionment.
Plaintiff urges a definition of "actionable" fault that
is too restrictive. An act or omission may be actionable even if
the plaintiff cannot, as a practical matter, secure a judgment
against a defendant. Black's defines "actionable" as "[t]hat for
which an action will lie, furnishing legal ground for an action."
Black's Law Dictionary 29 (6th ed. 1990). A plaintiff may have
legal grounds for a cause of action against a defendant, and the
defendant may be dismissed due to, for example, the assertion of
a successful affirmative defense. Thus, the Act's definition of
"fault" does not necessarily preclude the apportionment of fault
of nonparties.
Nevertheless, we hold that D&RG, which was dismissed
pursuant to an adjudication on the merits, may not be included in
apportionment. D&RG was dismissed due to a lack of fault as a
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natter of law. Thus, D&RG's exclusion will not subject remaining
defendants to potential liability for damages in excess of their
proportionate fault.
Trackmobile has also raised an equal protection
argument under the state and federal constitutions Because we
have interpreted the statutes at issue to require that the jury
apportion the fault of employers of plaintiffs in third-party
workers' compensation litigation, this issue need not be reached.
Based on the foregoing analysis, our answers to the
questions certified from the federal court are as follows:
1. A jury may apportion the fault of
employers under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 to
-43 notwithstanding their immunity under Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-60.
2. A jury may not apportion the fault
of a party that has been dismissed from the
lawsuit pursuant to an adjudication on the
merits of the liability issue.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chiet Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
Appendix
Apportionment of Nonparty Fault in Negligence Actions
in States Reported in the Pacific Reporter
States that have expressly adopted this practice by
statute include Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2506.B
fl991> Dietz v. General Eleci_CcK, 821 P.2d 166, 171 (Ariz.
19911 (including immune employers); Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat,
c n-2i-lll 5(3) (a) (1987), wjjliams v. White Mountain Constr.
C 749 P 2d 423, 429 (Colo. 1988) (same); Kansas, Kan. Stat.
7^' k aa S04.rd} (1986 & Supp. 1991), Brabander v.. Western Coop.%To'r IIP 2d 1216, 1219 (Kan. 1986) (same); New Mexico, N.M.
Stall?'Ann. §"41-3A-1.B (1989), Taylor_v^De_igarno. -Trans^_Lnc^,
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667 D.2d -145, 448 (N.M. 1983) (same), overruled on other grounds,
Xor.tova v. Akal Sec, Inc., 838 P.2d 971 (N.M. 1992); Washington,
Wasn. Rev. Code Ann. 5 4.22.070(1) (1988), Clark v. Pacificorp,
322 P.2d 162, 165 (Wash. 1991) (same).
In other states, courts have interpreted general
comparative negligence statutes to require apportionment of
nonDartv fault.' California, Cal. Civ. Code § 1431.2(a) (West
Suop. 1993), Mills v. MMM Carpets. Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 814
(Ct". App. 1991) (includinq immune employers) , review dismissed,
10 Cal".~RDtr. 2d 635 (1992); Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 663-31(b)(2) (1988), Esoaniola v. Cawdrev Mars Joint Venture,
707 P.2d 365, 373 (Haw. 1985) (same); Idaho, Idaho Code § 6-802
(1990), Pocatello Indus. Park v. Steel W. Inc., 621 P.2d 399, 403
& n.4 (Idaho 1980), Barringer v. .State, 727 P.2d 1222, 1224
(Idaho 1986) (same); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 13
(1987), Bode v. Clark Equip. Co., 719 P.2d 824, 826-27 (Okla.
1986) (same); Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 (1991), Burton v.
Fisher Controls Co., 723 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Wyo. 1986) (including
settling tort-feasors).
The following states retain joint and several liability
but allow the consideration of nonparty negligence for the
limited purpose of determining whether all or none of the total
fauit can be attributed to the nonparty. Alaska, Alaska Stat.
§ 09.17.080 (1991), Lake v. Construction Mach. , Inc., 787 P.2d
1027 1028, 1031 (Alaska 1990) (including immune employers);
Montana, Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-703(4) (1991) (expressly
excluding immune employers).
In contrast, only two states flatly refuse to allow a
jury to consider the fault of nonparties in apportionment.
Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.141.2(b)(2) (1986), Warmbrodt
v. Blanchard, 692 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Nev. 1984); Oregon, Or. R.
Civ. P. §§ 18.470, -.480 (1991), Mi lis v. Brown, 735 P.2d 603,
605 (Or. 1987).
STEWART. Justice (Dissenting):
The majority opinion holds that an immune non-defendant
should be included in the apportionment of fault to defendants
under the Liability Reform Act. I submit that the majority, in
direct defiance of the specific language of the Act and its
legislative history, completely reverses the intended effect of
the Act as to how fault should be apportioned when one of the
parties whose negligence contributed to the plaintiff's injuries
is immune from liability.
In 1973 the Utah Legislature adopted the Comparative
Neqligence Act, which abolished contributory negligence as an
absolute bar to an action but left intact the doctrine of joint
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and several liability. 1973 Utah Laws ch. 209. The Liability
Reform Act, adopted in 1986, carried forward several provisions
from the Comparative Negligence Act but dispensed with joint and
several liability. 1986 Utah Laws ch. 199. Under the Act, fault
is to be apportioned to each party, with each party bearing
liability for its apportioned fault. No party is liable for
fault apportioned to another party. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40.
The central issue in this lawsuit is how the
Legislature intended to apportion the fault of a person immune
from liability (a non-party) who is one of multiple tort-feasors
causing a plaintiff's injuries. The Legislature specifically
addressed and resolved that issue. The Act expressly provides
that fault shall not be allocated to a party immune from
liability. Section 78-27-39 states:
The trial court may, and when reauestcd by
any party, shall, direct the jury, if any, to
find separate special verdicts determining
the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery
and to each defendant.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, fault is to be attributed only to »eac:i
person seeking recovery and to each derendant." Tne Act then
defines the word "defendant" to specifically exclude persons who
are immune from liability. Section 78-27-37 states:
As used in Sections 78-27-37 througn
78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person
not immune from suit who is claimed to
be liable because of fault to any person
seeking recovery.
(Emphasis added.) This section makes clear that the term
defendant does not include negligent persons who are immune from
1lability" In short, the Legislature contemplated the issue at
hand and expressly provided that fault is to be allocated only
among non-immune parties to a lawsuit, even though an immune
person may be partly responsible for the plaintiff's injuries.
Two other sections in the Act not only reinforce, but
compel the same conclusion. Section 78-27-41 states that either
a plaintiff or a defendant who is a party to the litigation
may join as parties any defendants who may
have caused or contributed to the injury or
damages for which recovery is sought, for the
purpose of having determined their respective
proportions of fault.
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(Emphasis added.) In connection with that section, 5 78-27-39
requires special verdicts, when requested, for determining the
fault attributed to "each person seekinq recovery and to each ;
defendant." Both the joinder and special verdict provisions are .
specifically designed to provide the necessary mechanism for :
attributing fault only to non-immune defendants (as defined by
-he Act) and to plaintiffs. Thus, immune persons may not bejoined in an action, § 78-27-41, nor may fault be attributed to <
them. § 78-27-39. The majority's self-devised requirement that -
the fault of an immune party must be ascertained simply flouts
these provisions.
The purpose of joinder is to determine the non-immune
defendants' "respective proportions of fault." § 78-27-41. The
"fault" to be allocated is defined by § 78-27-37(2) as any
"actionable breach of legal duty . . . causing or contributing to
injury or damages . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Because an immune
party's negligence is not an "actionable breach of legal duty,'
that negligence cannot be apportioned. In short, an immune
oartv, sucn as plaintiff's employer in this action, has not
engaged in an "actionaole breacn of legal duty" and simply is not-
subject to the special verdict apportionment procedure unaer the
statute.
me Legislature could not have been more explicit and .
consistent in providing exactly how and to whom fault should be
allocated. Indeed, the Legislature expressly rejected the
position the majority adopts. Senate Bill 64, which became the
Act in issue, initially provided:
The trial court may, and when requested by
any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to
find separate jury verdicts determining the
total amount of damage sustained and the
percentage or proportion of fault
attributable to each person seeking recovery,
to each defendant, and to each other person ,
whose fault contributed to the iniurv or
damages.
fPmnhasis added.) The Senate committee report shows that the
Sicized phrase was purposefully deleted Left in, that phrase
would have done exactly what the majority does today. The
maiority nevertheless dismisses this compelling piece of
legislative history on the transparent ground that it is not
clear why the language was deleted.
The Legislature consciously adopted a policy that
excluded -e negligence of nonT^une Persons frem thejault ^
^endanSrSLr^Se ^ult of an immune party, the majority simply
sets aside the judgment of the Legislature as expressed in the :
explicit statutory language and imposes its own policy. What the
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m
ajority fails to recognize is that the policy adopted by the
Legislature divides the fault of an immune party among both
plaintiffs and defendants. The policy adopted by the majority, ;
on the other hand, loads that fault entirely onto a plaintiff. :'
The legislative policy is neither irrational nor
inequitable. Practically speaking, a jury would naturally be ,
inclined to allocate the fault of an immune person among both <:
plaintiffs and defendants. If a plaintiff is 20% at fault, each
of two named defendants is 30% at fault, and an immune person is
20% at fault, the Legislature could reasonably assume that a jury
would allocate the immune person's 20% fault among the plaintiff
and the defendants, probably according to their respective
percentages of "actionable fault." Thus, there is no reason to
assume, as the majority does, that the immune person's fault will
be attributed solely to defendants under Utah's comparative
negligence scheme..
The majority position will necessarily result in the
entire amount of an immune person's fault being deducted from a
plaintiff's damages. The blatant inequity of that position is
especially acute when an immune employer's insurance company
claims all or part ot a plaintiff's recovery by way or
subrogation under the Workers' Compensation Act.
The majority rejects clear and consistent statutory
language and its compelling legislative history with the
extraordinary argument that "failing to include immune employers
in the apportionment violates the main purpose ot the Act by_
improperly subjecting the remaining detendants to liability in
excess of their proportion of fault." I see nothing improper in
the legislative scheme. The fact is that it is for the
Legislature—not this Court.—to decide how to deal with the fault
of an immune party in a multi-defendant comparative negligence
case.
While it is true that the Act abolishes joint and '
several liability, that was not its sole purpose. The Act also
provides the manner in which fault should be allocated in
comparative negligence cases and how the universe of actionable
fault should be apportioned when one party is immune. As noted,_
even a plaintiff may be held responsible for a part of an immune'
person's negligence under the provisions of the Act. Defining
the universe of fault, as the Legislature has done, is not, at
bottom, an issue of joint and several liability. Rather, the
process turns on the concepts underlying proximate cause.
The existence of fault has always depended upon whether
the negligence of a party had a substantial causative connection
to a plaintiff's injuries. Because the law requires only a
substantial causative connection, a defendant or defendants may
be held legally responsible for causing an injury, even though
there are some actual causes for which the defendant or
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defendants are not responsible. But if a defendant's negligence
is not a substantial cause of the plaintiff's injuries, then no
liability may attach to that defendant. For this reason,
proximate cause is defined in terns of substantial causative
factors. That point is critical in the policy the Legislature
adopted. If an immune person's negligence is great enough, a
jury would be obliged to find that the named non-immune j
defendants did not proximately cause the injury, even if they [
were negligent, and thus deny the plaintiff any recovery. But if
the immune person's negligence is not that great, a jury will
have to determine the relative proportion of actionable fault
attributable to the plaintiffs and the named defendants. In this
process, the universe of fault to which the plaintiff and the
defendants contributed is the universe of actionable fault.
The damage the majority does to the legislative scheme
and to a plaintiff's rights is exacerbated by the provision in
the Workers' Compensation Act that gives an employer (whose fault
may have contributed to a plaintiff's injuries) a lien against
the plaintiff's damage recovery for benerits paid out of workers',
compensation. Thus, not only is the plaintiff made responsible
for the employer's proportionate share of fault, but he must
also reimburse his employer out of his diminished recovery for
any workers' compensation benefits received. This is not only
unjust and inequitable, but might well be unconstitutional.
Howe, Associate Chief Justice, ."ices not participate
herein.
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Order Extending Time to File Petition for Rehearing
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq., #A1582
M. Douglas Bayly, Esq., #A0251
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
175 South West Temple, #510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,
v.
Plaintiff/Certified
Plaintiff,
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY;
a Utah corporation, TRACKMOBILE,
INC., a Georgia corporation,
formerly known as Whiting Corp.,
THE OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, G.W. VAN KEPPEL
COMPANY, a Missouri corporation,
Defendants/Certified
Defendants.
No. 910482
87-C-330G
Priority 12
ORDER EXTENDING TIME
TO FILE PETITION FOR
REHEARING
Pursuant to the ex-parte motion of Kenneth Sullivan and
good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plain
tiff Sullivan may have to and including May 20, 1993 to file his
petition for rehearing in the above-captioned matter.
DATED this ^ day of May, 1993.
BY THE COURT:
Utah Supreme Court Justice
The Court, after review of the bases of the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah's
Motion to Appear as Amicus Curiae in the above appeal, grants the Motion.
Dated this ~? day of May, 1993.
JUSTICE.
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APPENDIX C
Utah Code § 78-27-37 et seq
78-27-3,5 JUDICIAL CODE
78-27-35. Release, settlement, or statement bv injured per
son — Notice of rescission or disavowal.
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a statement if^v«n h„ -i
parncular form and ,s sufficent .fit mdicates bv anvform ofTrfttenexpres
--ion the intention ol the injured person not to be bonnn hv ,h ,,i
agreement, liab.lity release, or disavowed statement ' ^ >ettie™m
History: L. 1973, ch. 208. § 4.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 66 Am Jur 2d Release $ 14
et seq
C.J.S. —"6 CJS Release 4 38 et seq
78-27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release set
tlement, or statement by injured person in addi
tion to other provisions.
The rights provided by this act are intended to be maddition to and not in
™t;nVr\heglaSw0t ^^ ^ <* ™d™' « P— »^
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, S, 5.
Meaning of "this act." - See note follow
ing same catchhne in notes to i 78-27-32.
78-27-37. Definitions.
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43'
••I* "Defendant'' means any person not immune from suit who is
claimea to be huole because of fauit to any person seeing recovery
,J Fa^!t means any acnonable breach of legal dutv, act or omissionproximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained bv a
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to negligence in all
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liabUitvbreach of express or implied warranty of aproduct, products liability and
misuse, modification or abuse of a product k>.««iu
i3i "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeing damages or
reimnursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom ft °s
authorized to act as legal representative,
i^rM if 78-27-;,?'enacted by L- rd hiUws i973'ch- 2°9' *>«>»<»*«•
Repeals and Reenactments.-Laws 1986 -!™ ™nt °f dama«es *nd assumpuon of
en. 1989, j 1 repeals former ; 7R-27-37, 33 en- nsk. and reenacts the abovi
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
78-27-38
Cited in Deats v Commercial Sec, Bank,
746 P.2d 1191 (Utah Ct. App 1987i
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law, — For
comment, "The Liability Reform Act An Ap
proach to Equitable Application." see 13 J.
Contemp. L 89 (1987).
A.L.R. — Liability to one struck bv coif bal
53 A.L.R 4th 282.
78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery bv that
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L.
1986, ch. \99, § 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1966.
ch. 199, 5 2 repeals lormer 5 7S-27-38. as en
acted bv Laws 1973, ch. 209, i 2. relating to
special verdicts, and reenacts the above sec
tion.
Cross-Heferences. — Product Liability Act,
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration
or modification of product after sale is substan
tial contributing cause of iruury. 5 78-15-5
Skiers not to make claim against or recover
from ski area operator for injury resulting from
anv inherent risk of skiing, ^ 78-27-53
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Analysis
Assumption of nsk
Bailment.
Causation.
Dramshops
Jury instructions.
Last clear chance.
Open and obvious danger.
Unit method of determining negligence.
Wrongful death.
Cited,
Assumption of risk.
"Assumption of nsk." l e.. nsk of a known
danger voluntarily assumed, may amount to a
lack of due care constituting negligence; where
such is the case and the partv assuming the
nsk is the plaintiff in an action governed by
comparative negligence statute, he is charge
able with contributory negligence and is liable
to have his recovery reduced or denied in accor
dance with its provisions Rintrup v Straw
berry Water Users Assn. 563 P.2d 1247 'Utah
19771, overruled on other grounds, Moore v
Burton LumDer & Hdwe. Co, 631 P.2d 865
(Utah 1981!.
Assumption of risk language is not appropri
ate to describe the various concepts previously
dealt with under that terminology but is to be
treated, in its secondary sense, as contributory
negligence, when the issue is raised attention
should he focused on whether a reasonably pru
dent man in the exercise ol due care would
have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge
of it, and if so. whether he would have con
ducted himself in the manner in which the per
son seeking to recover acted in light of al! the
surrounding circumstances, including the ap
preciated risk; then, if the unreasonableness of
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be
less than that of the person from whom recov
ery is sought, any damages allowed should be
diminished m proportion to the amount of neg
ligence attributable to the person recovering
Jaconsen Constr. Co. v Structo-Lite Eng g,
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1981K
As used in § 78-27-37, "assumption of risk"
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a
known danger. Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hdwe Cu , 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 19Sli
Assumption of nsk language is not appropri
ate in an instruction under comparative negli
gence statutes. Stephens v Henderson. 7-11
P 2d 952 (Utah 1987' iapplying statute m ef
fect prior to 19861.
The assumption ofri.sk doctrine has been ex-
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grigham Young Law Review. — The
Merger of Comparative Eault Principles with
cmct Liability in Utah: Mulhenn v ingersoll-
Xuid Co . 1981 B.Y U. L. Rev 964, 966.
Damage Apportionment m Accounting Mal-
urBCtice Actions; The Role of Comparative
Fault, 1990 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 949.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For
comment. "The Liability Reform Act: An Ap
proach to Equitable Application," 13 J.
Contemp. L. 89 (1987).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 57B Am. Jur. 2d Negligence
{ 1128 et seq.
C.J.S. — 65A C.J.S Negligence 6 169 et
aeo..
A-L.R- — Comparative negligence rule
where misconduct of three or more persons is
evolved. 8 A.L.R.3d 722
Retrospective application of state statute
substituting rule of comoarative negligence for
that of contributory negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d
1438,
Indemnity or contribution between joint tort
feasors on basis of relative fault, 53 A.L.R.3d
1S4.
Modem development of comparative negli
gence doctrine having applicability to negli
gence actions generally. 78 A.L.R,3d 339.
Application of comparative negligence doc
trine, generally, 86 A.L.R.3d 12(16
Comparative negligence doctrine applied to
actions based on strict liability in tort, 9
A.L.R.4th 633.
Effect of adoption of comparative negligence
rules on assumption of risk and contributory
negligence, 16 A.L.R.4th 700
Commercial renter's negligence liability for
customer's personal injuries, 57 A.L.R 4th
1186.
Liability to one struck by golf club. 63
A.LR.4th'221
Liability for injury incurred in operation of
power golf cart. 66 A.L.R.4th 622
Tort liability for window washer's injury or
death, 69 A.L.R.4th 207
Comparative fault, calculation of net recov
ery by applying percentage of plaintiffs fault
before or after subtracting amount of settle
ment bv less than all joint tortfeasors, 71
A.L.R.4th 1108.
Rescue doctrine: applicability and applica
tion of comparative negligence principles, 75
A.L.R.4th 875,
Key Numbers. — Negligence «= 97 et seq.
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and
proportion of fault.
The trial court may. and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury,
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of dam
ages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each
person seeking recover.' and to each defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L.
1986. chl 199. § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986.
ch. 199. f 3 repeals former * 78-27-39. as en
acted by Laws 1973. ch. 209, =; 3. relating to
contribution among joint tortfeasors, and reen
acts the above section
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Analysis
Jury instructions.
Cit*d.
Jury instructions.
If requested, a trial court must inform the
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning
to the plaintiff SO1"' or more of the negligence it
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the
effect of such an instruction will not be to con
fuse or mislead the jurv. Dixon v Stewart, 658
P.2d 591 'Utah 1982'.
Cited in Reeves v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111
(Utah 199U.
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78-27-40 JUDICIAL CODE
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault
— No contribution.
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant
may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion
of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other
person.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-40, enacted by L,
1986, ch. 199, $ 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 19H6,
ch. 199. J) 4 repeals former $ 78-27-40, as en
acted bv Laws 1973. ch. 209, $ 4. relating to
settlement by a joint tortfeasor, and reenacts
the above section.
Cross-References. — Enforcement of con
tribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 69! hi.
Joint obligations. $ 15-4-1 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Analysis
Applicability of section.
Indemnity contract.
Plaintiff's minor child as joint tortfeasor.
Workers' compensation.
Cited.
Applicability of section.
A statute, sucn as this section, eliminating
joint and several liability may not be applied to
iniunes occurring prior to its effective date.
Where the injuries occurred on November 8.
1984, and the Liability Reform Act was not
effective until April 28, 1986. the trial court
was correct in holding that the Liability Re
form Act did not apply. Stephens v. Henderson,
741 P.2d 9,52 (Utah"l987>.
Indemnity contract.
The former comparative negligence provi
sions did not invalidate an employer's indem
nity contract with a third party whereby em
ployer agreed to indemnify the third party
against claims arising out of injuries to the em -
plover's employees. Shell Oil Co. v
BnnkerhotfSignal Drilling Co.. 658 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1983'.
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor.
Where plaintiff was awarded a judgment m
action against a defendant to recover the prop
erty loss sustained as the result of a collision
between automobiles operated by defendant
and the minor unemancipated daughter of the
plaintiff, and where the daughter's negligence
contributed to the property loss sustained bv
her lather, the minor daughter was a joint tort
feasor and liable to the defendant for contribu
tion. Bishop v. Nielsen. 632 P.2d 864 (Utah
19811.
Workers' compensation.
Employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor as to
an injury to his employee covered by the Work
men's Compensation Act. Curtis v. Harmon
Elec. Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976); Phillips
v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 'Utah 1980).
Cited in Warren v. Honda Motor Co. 669 F
Supp. 365 (D. Utah 1987'
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah Al
lows Contribution Against Cotortfeasor De
spite Immunity from Direct Suit: Bishop v.
Nielsen, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 429.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Com
ment. The Liability Reform Act: An Approach
to Equitable Application, 13 J. Contbinp. L. 89
U987)
A.L.R. — Right of tortfeasor initially caus
ing injury to recover indemnity or contribution
from medical attendant aggravating injury or
causing new injury in course of treatment 72
A.LR.4th 231.
Products liability: seller's right to indemnity
from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R,4th 278.
434
1
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 78-27-43
78-27-41. Joinder of defendants.
Aperson seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation,
may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having
determined their respective proportions of fault.
Historv: C. 1953. 78-27-41. enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199. 5 5.
Repeals and Keenactments. - Laws 1986, acts "the above" section
ch. 199, 5 5 repeals former ^ 78-27-41, as en
acted bv Laws 1973. ch 209. ; 5. relating to
ngnts ol contribution and indemnity, and reen-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Products iiaDihtv sellers ncht to
indemnity :rarr. man mac'.u re r. 79 A L R 4th
278
78-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge
other defendants.
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does
not aischarge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-42. enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199. * 6.
Repeals and Keenactments. — Law;. 1986.
ch. 199, ^ 6 repeals former } 78-27-42. as en
acted bv Laws 1973. ch 209, i 6, relating to
release ot mint tortfeasors and a reduction ot
claim, and reenacts the above section.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am Jur 2d Release S 35
et seq
C.J.S. — 76 C J S Reiease ; 38 et seq.
A.L.R. — Tortfeasor s genera! release of co-
tortteasor as affecting former';, right of contri
bution against cotortfeasor, 34 A L.R.3d 1374
Release of one responsible for injurv as af
fecting liability of physician or surgeon tor
negligent treatment of injury. 39 A.L.R 3d 260.
Voluntary payment into court of judgment
atfain.it one oim tortfeasor u-= release ot"others,
•10 A L K .-Id 11S1
Reiease ol one neeiieentiv treating iniurv as
affecting liability of one originally responsible
tor injury, 64 A.L.R.3d h.'J9
Validity and effect ot agreement with one
cotortfeasor setting aside his maximum liabil
ity and providing for reduction or extinguish
ment thereof relative to recovery acainst non-
aereeing co tortfeasor. 65 A L R od 602
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indem
nity, contribution.
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs anv com
mon law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limited to,
governmental immunity as provided in Title 63, Chapter 30, and the exclu
sive remedy provisions of Title 35, Chapter 1, Nothing in Sections 78-27-37
through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution
arising from statute, contract, or agreement.
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Utah Code § 35-1-62
r 35-1-62
35-1-62.
LABOR __ INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Ployee of said empToyeT- KehuJ^l °r em"insurance carriPr;„ "ights of employer or
than an employer, officer, agent or elt f f" n?giect,of aP^son other
employee, or mcase ofdeath his depenTn 71 f-d emPlo-™r. the injuredinjured employee or his heirs operson* ' "^ da,m compensation and the
action for damages against sZhtOT^uT^"" ^ a'S° have «"
the employer or insurance earner becomes ohliXTf6"331'™ 'S clalmed ^
employer or insurance carrier shall ZZ f '" Pay compensation, the
aga.nst the third party and ma^t ' and ma[ni " if the C3USe °f act>™
own name or in the name of the' n,"^ ,maintam the action either in its
representative of the 4^^™^?-%"*^™*'^™!
settle and release the cause of acfion wfthout th P y6r °r Camer ma-v notBefore proceeding aga,nst the third part' the n T" ,°f the comm^ion.death, h.8 heirs, shall give written no£e rfJT^ emPlo-vee. or. ,n case of
other person obligated for the compensation 'Mention to the earner or
person a reasonable opportumy"enteTan^T"1^ '" °rder t0 gIVe suchFor the purposes of this section and ncLlth t^T^ '" the P™ceed,ng.
t> on 35-1-42. the injured employ™ or h," he" sorn K^ Pr°V1S10ns of Se-
also maintain an action for damages ~, s"h f° "tentative mav
tors, independent contractors, propem otn* ZUrac,t0™- general contrac-
occupymg an employee-employer re at.onshn ^li ^^ °r aSS1^s- not
employee at the time of his mjurv o deatn' ^ mJUred °r decea'^Jfany recovery ,s obtained aga.nst such th^d person ,t shall be disbursed as
shall heh;^rdactr1ePd Z;o^onatCefn' '"^^ —ys' *es.interests mav appear Anv such fc?,h^ga'nSt the Partles as their
- to be acredit upon anyVfe pathe bTth*"• '" "if empl°-Ver or —
~ death, by thet^lt^^^'^
attorneys' fees provided fort SubseltK?'™* ^ °f ^ ^
-"^XZ^X^:^ ITtd;-10- »*« ^ ,nthereafter accruing a/aLt ^ p^^Tl^^^
5?.r!°7: L' 1917' ch- 10°- *72; CL 1917
r;'^'Vh'65'§ 1: 197]- <*• 76. $3- 1973ch- 67, ft 7; 1975, ch. 101, §3. '
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
KENNETH SULLIVAN
Plaintiff,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF UTAH;
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY;
a Utah corporation, SCOULAR
GRAIN COMPANY, THE SCOULAR
COMPANY, ROBERT O'BLOCK
and GORDON OLCH dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES,
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
corporation, formally known as
Whiting Corp., THE DENVER AND
RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a Missouri
corporation.
Defendants.
ORDER OF CERTIFICATION
Civil No. 87-C-330G
100.
101603be
3P»
r r
TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT:
The United States District Court for the District of Utah, on
its own motion, pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, requests the Utah Supreme Court to answer the following
questions of Utah law:
1. Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code
Annot. §78-27-38, et.seq., can a jury apportion the fault
of the plaintiff's employers that caused or contributed
to the accident although said employers are immune from
suit under Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann.
S 35-1-60, et. seq.
2. Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-38, et seq. , can a jury apportion the fault of an
individual or entity that has been dismissed from the
litigation but against whom it is claimed that they have
caused or contributed to the accident.
The above questions are controlling issues of law in the
above-captioned proceeding pending before the certifying court. It
is crucial that the proper determination as to which parties' fault
may be compared take place before trial, as an erroneous decision
on this issue by the certifying court will certainly result in a
retrial of the case.
1018Q3bc
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There appears to be no controlling Utah law with respect to
this question. The Utah state courts and the United States
District Courts for the State of Utah have rendered differing
opinions on this question and the same issue is commonly raised in
many personal injury actions involving injuries occurring in the
workplace.
NATURE OF CONTROVERSY, CONTEXT IN WHICH QUESTION AROSE,
AND PROCEDURAL STEPS BY WHICH QUESTION WAS FRAMED
The facts relevant to the determination of the question
certified are as follows:
1. Plaintiff Kenneth Sullivan ("Sullivan") filed this
personal injury action for damages resulting in the loss of his
left arm and left leg from an accident which occurred on the
railroad tracks at the Freeport Center, Clearfield, Utah, on
October 17, 1986. Sullivan was employed by Scoular Grain Company,
Freeport Center Associates and Scoular Grain Company of Utah (a
joint venture comprised of Scoular Grain Company and Freeport
Center Associates), hereafter collectively referred to as "the
Scoular Parties." At the time of his injury plaintiff was assigned
to unload grain from rail cars into warehouses. Sullivan received
approximately $200,000.00 in worker's compensation for his
injuries.
2. Sullivan filed this action against the Scoular Grain
Parties, Union Pacific Railroad Company, Denver & Rio Grande
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Western Railroad Company, Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, Utah
Power & Light Company, Trackmobile, Inc. and G.W. Van Keppel
Company. Plaintiff's complaint alleges claims under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act ("FELA") (45 U.S.C.A. S 51 et seq.), the
Boiler Inspection Act ("BIA") {45 U.S.C.A. § 23), the Safety
Appliance Act ("SAA") (45 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.), state statutory
laws, contractual duties and state common law claims of negligence
and products liability.
3. In 1989 the Scoular Parties filed motions for summary
judgment. The district court granted defendants' motions for
summary judgment and found the Scoular Parties were not a "common
carrier by railroad" under FELA and dismissed this cause of action.
In addition, the court found that the Scoular Parties were the
"immediate and common law employers of the plaintiff," and were
therefore immune from plaintiff's claim for personal injuries under
the exclusive remedy provision of Utah's Workers Compensation Law,
Section 35-1-62, U.C.A. as amended. The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has affirmed the district court's rulings.
4. Defendant Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company
moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) it was not
plaintiff's employer and could not be liable to plaintiff under
FELA, (2) it was not liable under the Safety Appliance Act or the
Boiler Inspection Act, and (3) it did not owe plaintiff any duty of
1O1803bc 4
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care with respect to the condition of the tracks at the Freeport
Center. The district court granted this defendant's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed it from the lawsuit.
5. Defendant Utah Power & Light Company moved for a dismissal
on the grounds that the court's dismissal of the Scoular Parties
left no substantial federal question to be decided and the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction over defendant would be unconstitutional.
The district court has not ruled on this defendant's motion to
dismiss.
6. Defendants Union Pacific Railroad Company and Oregon Short
Line Railroad Company moved the district court for a dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint as against them on the grounds that there is
no FELA, BIA or SAA jurisdiction as a matter of law, and that no
diversity jurisdiction exists. The district court dismissed
plaintiff's causes of action based upon the FELA, BIA and SAA but
denied defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of diversity
jurisdiction.
7. The remaining defendants in the case are UP&L,
Trackmobile, G. W. Van Keppel, Union Pacific Railroad Company and
Oregon Short Line Railroad Company.
8. Substantial discovery has taken place in this matter and
plaintiff's experts have testified that all named defendants
101SC3bc
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(including those that have been dismissed) are at fault in more
than one particular.
9. Defendant Trackmobile filed a motion to have the jury
apportion and compare the fault of all named defendants, whether
dismissed or present at trial. This motion is contested by the
plaintiff who claims that only the fault of the nonemployer party
defendants may be compared. The district court has not yet ruled
on this motion.
SUBMISSION OF RECORD
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court, under its
official seal, forward this certification order to the Utah Supreme
Court and file with the Utah Supreme Court any portion of the
record before this Court that may be required by the Utah Supreme
Court.
, 1991.
BY THE COURT:
DATED this |>"l-^day of fj^X^r£/\
101803bc
. Greene
U/3*. District Court Judge
cAPPROVED AS TO FO
t>lJ.'Rich Humpher
y for
T,Jtt/AjyClare
Attorney for Defendants Union
Pacific ^and Oregon Shortline
H. James 'ciegg
Attorney for Utah Power &
Light Company
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(
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United States District Court
for the
District of Utah
October 8, 1991
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * *
True and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to the
following:
D. Gary Christian, Esq.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 East 400 South #330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
J. Clare Williams, Esq.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
406 West First South
Sal Lake City, UT 84101
David J. Jordan, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Paul M. Belnap, Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
Boston Building 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
James Clegg, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place #1100
P.O. BOX 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 S West Temple /510
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
APPENDIX F
Affidavits
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Dennis V. Lloyd #1984
Attorney at Law
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*************
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a UTAH CORPORATION;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK, and GORDON OLCH,
dba FREEPORT CENTER
ASSOCIATES; TRACKMOBILE,
INC., a GEORGIA CORPORATION,
FORMERLY KNOWN AS WHITING
CORP.; THE DENVER AND RIO
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, A SHORT LINE
RAILROAD COMPANY, a DELAWARE
CORPORATION; OREGON SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
UTAH CORPORATION; UTAH POWER
& LIGHT COMPANY, A UTAH
CORPORATION; and G.W. VAN
KEPPEL COMPANY, a MISSOURI
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
******
AFFIDAVIT OF SENATOR
HAVEN J. BARLOW, SPONSOR OF
S.B. 64, 1986 UTAH
LEGISLATURE a/k/a LIABILITY
REFORM ACT OF 19 8 6
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
******
Senator Haven J. Barlow, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states the following to be true to his personal knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I was and
I am currently a duly elected Senator serving in the Senate of the
State of Utah.
2. I was principal sponsor of Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter
S.B. 64") , a proposed Liability Reform Act. After my bill's
initial version was drafted and circulated among legislators and
interested parties, I became aware that the State Insurance Fund
(now known as the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, hereinafter
"WCF") and others had serious concerns about the affect the
proposed legislation would have on the Workers' Compensation Act of
Utah (Sections 35-1-1 et seq. U.C.A.). We did not want to disturb
in any manner the present procedures and operation of the WCF or
Utah's workers' compensation system.
3. The concern with the original versions of S.B. 64 as
expressed to me by those parties was that the language might
disturb or could alter the procedures of the workers' compensation
system in several ways.
4. After my study of the situation, I became convinced that
S.B. 64 should be amended to avoid any potential that it would
increase the cost of or alter the workers' compensation system as
it had existed theretofore.
5. Therefore, after further discussions with interested
parties and other legislators, S.B. 64 was amended to address those
concerns. As part of those changes, the term "defendant" was then
2
limited by definition to "...those not immune from suit." (Section
78-27-37 U.C.A.).
6. To leave no doubt of the relationship of the Liability
Reform Act of 1986 to the Workers Compensation Act, S.B. 64
included as proposed Section 78-27-43 U.C.A. the language that
nothing in the Act was to "...affect or impair...the exclusive
remedy provisions of Title 35, Chapter 1."
7. S.B. 64 was then passed into law with little floor debate.
8. The 1986 Legislature intended to do away with joint and
several liability that had previously been the law in Utah. The
Legislature perceived joint and several liability to be an unfair
spreading of the responsibility for negligently caused injuries.
9. It is my opinion that the Legislature intended that
employers be excluded from any fault comparison so as not to alter
the Workers' Compensation Act because their responsibility for
their injured employees was already provided for in the Act. The
Legislature did not want to do anything that would affect the
balance between injured workers' and employers' rights as contained
in the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah. Specifically, the
Legislature did not want to affect the "exclusive remedy"
protection of Section 35-1-60 U.C.A., the cost to employers of
providing no fault workers' compensation benefits for their
employees, or the subrogation right of Section 35-1-62, U.C.A.
10. At this time, I have no recollection of any floor debate
or discussions among legislators which would demonstrate any
legislative intent regarding S.B. 64 contrary to that which I have
stated in this affidavit.
Dated this 19th day of May, 1993.
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the \ 1 day of May, 1993, personally appeared before me
Senator Haven Barlow, the signer of the above instrument, and duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
My Commission Expires:
-7 - ^o-ir
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NOTARY PUBLIC
DENNIS V. LLOYD
1321 Rebecca Circle .
Sa)tUkeCity.UtahMH7 I
My Commission Expires 7^20/95*
-iiATE OF UTAH
r^ ~>ll rJTJ.
NOTARY PUBLIC
z&^
Residing at: L d J^i.
DENNIS V. LLOYD #1984
GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF FORMER
REPRESENTATIVE,
JACK DEMANN REGARDING
S.B. 64, 1986 UTAH
LEGISLATURE a/k/a THE
LIABILITY REFORM ACT OF
1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*******
Jack DeMann, being first duly sworn, deposes and states
the following to be true to his personal knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature, I
was a duly elected Representative serving in the House of
Representatives.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session. I served as
that Act's House Sponsor.
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature did not intend
to affect Utah's workers' compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
4. I have reviewed the affidavits dated the 19th day
of May 1993 of Senator Haven J. Barlow and former Senator
Paul Rogers concerning the intent of the 1986 Legislature
in passing the Act. From my personal knowledge I concur
that my intent and that of the House of Representatives at
the time of passage of S.B. 64 was as stated in those
affidavits.
5. To the best of my knowledge, no representative
expressed any intent for the language of S.B. 64 different
than that which I have stated herein nor different than that
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stated by Senator Barlow and former Senator Paul Rogers in
their affidavits.
My Commission Expires:
7 - a o -n^.
trtUlaCfty.tft*iS4ii7 I
WyCH—llllOllExptrtl 7/20/951
STATE OF UTAH ]
DeMann
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Former Representative Jack DeMann, the signer of
the above instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
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DENNIS V. LLOYD #1984
GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF FORMER
SENATOR Paul Rogers, A
SPONSOR OF S.B. 64, 1986
UTAH LEGISLATURE a/k/a
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
OF 1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*******
Former Senator Paul Rogers, being first duly sworn,
deposes and states the following to be true to his personal
knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was a duly elected Senator serving in the Senate of the
State of Utah. I am currently under contract with the
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah (hereinafter the "Fund")
as a consultant regarding legislative matters which affect
the workers compensation system and the Fund's operations.
2. I was a sponsor of Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter
"S.B. 64"), the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter
the "Act").
3. I am familiar with the amendments that were made to
S.B. 64.
4. I have reviewed the affidavit dated the 19th day of
May, 1993, of Senator Haven J. Barlow concerning the intent
of the 1986 Legislature (hereinafter the "Legislature") in
passing the Act. From my personal knowledge I concur that
my intent and that of the 1986 Legislature was as stated by
Senator Barlow.
5. Also, I have read the Supreme Court of Utah's
decision in the case of Sullivan vs. Scoular Grain Company
of Utah, et al., Utah Supreme Court No. 910482. The
majority opinion therein determined a legislative intent
contrary to my intent as a sponsor of the legislation and
contrary to the intent of the Legislature. It was never the
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intent of the Legislature for the injured employee to bear
the burden of the employer's conduct alone by having the
third-party damages reduced by the employer's proportionate
"fault" and then requiring the injured worker to reimburse
the employer the full amount of the subrogation allowed by
Section 35-1-62 U.C.A. of the Workers Compensation Act of
Utah. Rather, the amendments which became a part of the Act
were designed to make it clear that the employer's conduct
was not to be compared to that of the injured employee and
the defendant(s) in a civil lawsuit. The employer's
responsibility for all their injured employees was provided
for by their participation in the no-fault workers
compensation system.
6. To the best of my knowledge, no legislator
expressed any intent for the language of S.B. 64 different
than that which I have stated herein nor different than that
stated by Senator Barlow in his affidavit.
Former Senator Paul Rogers
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Senator Paul Rogers, the signer of the above
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instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
i
My Commission Expires:
-7- io-i^
81484-1
NOTARvTuBUc"""!
DENNIS* LLOYD
1321 Retweca Ctrclt |
Sill LikiCtty. Utah 14117 I
My CommisifeM Exptrw 7/20^95|
STATE OF UTAH !
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NOTARY PUBLIC ^
Residing at: s: L^C <^-r—
DENNIS V. LLOYD #1984
GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF SENATOR
ARNOLD CHRISTENSEN,
REGARDING S.B. 64, 1986
UTAH LEGISLATURE a/k/a
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
OF 1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*******
Senator Arnold Christensen, being first duly sworn,
deposes and states the following to be true to his personal
knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was and currently am a duly elected Senator serving in the
Utah State Legislature and functioning in the office of
Senate President.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session.
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature did not intend
to affect Utah's workers' compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
4. Specifically the Legislature did not intend to do
anything that would in any way affect or call in question
the "Exclusive Remedy Protection" afforded employers by UCA
Section 35-1-60, or add to the cost borne by employers of
providing no-fault workers' compensation benefits to their
employees.
5. To the best of my knowledge, no legislator
expressed any intent for the language of S.B. 64 different
than that which I have stated herein.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
ss.
/>• ^ z t-^' <~-~'—v. , «—-_—i—-
Senator Arnold Christensen
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On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Senator Arnold Christensen the signer of the above
instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:
81484-1
B:\REPRE5ENT.AFF
Residing at: //x^ ^&cj/a^X
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DENNIS V. LLOYD #1984
GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 53 0-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF SENATOR
STEPHEN J. REES,
REGARDING S.B. 64, 1986
UTAH LEGISLATURE a/k/a
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
OF 1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*******
Senator Stephen J. Rees, being first duly sworn,
deposes and states the following to be true to his personal
knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was and I am currently a duly elected member of the Utah
Legislature. In 1986 I served in the House of
Representatives. Today I am a member of the Senate.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature1 did not intend
to affect Utah's workers' compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
V:Z A Ay<?'<*>
Senator Stephen J. Rees
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Senator Stephen J. Rees the signer of the above
instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
My Commission Expires:
7 - oo -n sr
NOTARY PUBLIC 7
Residing at: il.c , uf.
r"^~JJTl^ ~~""notaryTubuc"""1
^#£§*V DENNIS* LLOYD j
i is( S^fiaf ltt 1K1 ««t»cca Ctrcie | - 2 -
! V\ S"r*B hi Salt Lake City Utah M117 II N&vjM'f/jy MyCommiMionE)(ptrti7/20>95|
• X^iii^/ STATE OF UTAH !
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session. %• ^ jutX 'lAtt/
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GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
0'BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF SENATOR
ELDON A. MONEY
REGARDING S.B. 64, 1986
UTAH LEGISLATURE a/k/a
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
OF 1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*******
Senator Eldon A. Money, being first duly sworn, deposes
and states the following to be true to his personal
knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was and I am currently a duly elected member of the Utah
Legislature.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session.
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature did not intend
to affect Utah's workers' compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
Senator Eldon A. Money
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Senator Eldon A. Money, the signer of the above
instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
My Commission Expires:
~7 - O <r, - n ^
I -
NOTARV PUBLIC
nENNIS V. LLOYD
'3^Ret>Bcc*CiTc*e
Salt LakeCity.UtahM117
My CommiHlH jtHmMQm
•TATt OP UTAH
1_ i i t~<r.
Residing at:
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DENNIS V. LLOYD #1984
GENERAL COUNSEL
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7 300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O'BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF SENATOR
BLAZE D. WHARTON,
REGARDING S.B. 64, 1986
UTAH LEGISLATURE a/k/a
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
OF 1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*******
Senator Blaze D. Wharton, being first duly sworn,
deposes and states the following to be true to his personal
knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was and I am currently a duly elected member of the Utah
Legislature. In 1986 I served in the House of
Representatives. Today I am a member of the Senate.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session.
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature did not intend
to affect Utah's workers' compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
Senator/fi'laze D.Wharton
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Senator Blaze D. Wharton the signer of the above
instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
My Commission Expires:
•*nilS V. LLOYD
j2i Rebecca Grdt .
San Lake Ctty. Utah*4117 I
My Cnnwlaaaw faaeree 7/20/95|
•TATl Of UTAH I
cy V L--V 1. \^.—i
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:_
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392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8060
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs .
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
0*BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES
YARDLEY REGARDING S.B.
64, 1986 UTAH
LEGISLATURE a/k/a THE
LIABILITY REFORM ACT OF
1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*******
Representative James Yardley, being first duly sworn,
deposes and states the following to be true to his personal
knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was a duly elected Representative serving in the House of
Representatives of the State of Utah. I have continued
serving in that capacity to this day.
2. I recall clearly Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B.
64"), the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the
"Act").
3. I am familiar with the final version of S.B. 64
which eventually came to the floor of the House of
Representatives for passage.
4. I have reviewed the affidavits dated the 19th day
of May 1993 of Senator Haven J. Barlow and former Senator
Paul Rogers concerning the intent of the 1986 Legislature
(hereinafter the "Legislature") in passing the Act. From my
personal knowledge I concur that my intent and that of the
House of Representatives at the time of passage of S.B. 64
was as stated in those affidavits.
5. The intent of the Legislature was that the workers
compensation system was not to be affected in any way
whatsoever.
6. To the best of my knowledge, no representative
expressed any intent for the language of S.B. 64 different
than that which I have stated herein or different than that
- 2 -
stated by Senator Barlow and former Senator Paul Rogers in
their affidavits.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me Representative James Yardley, the signer of the
above instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
NOTARY
My Commission Expires:
"7 - ^-c, ~ n ~
DENNIS V. LLOYD
91 '321 Rebecca O'Cie
Sail Lake Cily Utah84ii?
MyCommission Expires 7/20.95
STATE OF UTAH
^epresenta£iTve /James Yardley
: ss.
PUBLIC
Residing at: -^ l,^l_ , M
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392 East 6400 South
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CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
JAMES R. BLACK #0357
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O*BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
VAN KEPPEL COMPANY, a
Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF
-^ <?» >-i -^ jQ_
Jain P t± •^ i'^ r <~ ^1REGARDING S.B. 64, 1986
UTAH LEGISLATURE a/k/a
THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT
OF 1986
Utah Supreme Court No.
910482
*******
S t- v -i n-fcr . \ s, I , l. \ f~ . H e\^'i t-> ^ o r ^ v'
duly sworn, deposes and states the following to be true to
his personal knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was and I am currently a duly elected member of the Utah
Legislature.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session.
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature did not intend
to affect Utah's workers' compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
, being first
tLc>] A
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me S^ i-^-ho .- ~J<-. I-
My Commission Expires:
7 - j^- «7>7
NOTARY PUBLIC
DENNIS V. LLOYD
1321 Rebecca Circle
Salt LakeCity. Utah W117
My CommuiwnExpires 7/20/96
STATE OF UTAH
)
: ss.
P. H ^Kng-.rr >-i
the above instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
.oJ2--V W t ^2.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:_
- 2 -
, the signer of
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800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
*******
KENNETH RAY SULLIVAN,,
Plaintiffs,
vs
SCOULAR GRAIN COMPANY OF
UTAH; UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
THE SCOULAR COMPANY, ROBERT
O1BLOCK AND GORDON OLCH, dba
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES;
TRACKMOBILE, INC., a Georgia
Corporation, Formerly Known
as WHITING CORP.; THE DENVER
AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, A SHORT
LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation; OREGON
SHORT LINE RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; and G.W.
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Missouri Corporation,,
Defendants.
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ow)
_, being first
duly sworn, deposes and states the following to be true to
his personal knowledge:
1. During the 1986 session of the Utah Legislature I
was and I am currently a duly elected member of the Utah
Legislature.
2. I recall Senate Bill 64 (hereinafter "S.B. 64"),
the Liability Reform Act of 1986 (hereinafter the "Act")
passed during the 1986 Legislative Session.
3. In passing the Act, the Legislature did not intend
to affect Utah's workers' compensation system in any way
whatsoever.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the 19th day of May, 1993, personally appeared
before me P- p^<--<-, ,K ,4- .,^ i.^,-, ^ H. the signer of
the above instrument, and duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
My Commission Expires:
WOTAKV PUBLIC I
KXMtt t LLOYD
W1 Mlm Pre* !
•eeilafceOty. Lfuft Wtt7 I
tfyCaaweiaeaatiaeret 7/20/%|
Il___^^ STAT* Of UTAH j
(%U*J>7J. /M^v^
: ss.
_L 'c--' • '-* •- •- _L
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
- 2 -
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